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Abstract
Seminal papers about asymmetry of information in a competitive insurance market,
and the monetary deductible as a screening device show that any existing equilib-
rium is of a separating type. High risks buy complete insurance whilst low risks
buy partial insurance. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) deal with insurance companies
showing Nash behaviour, while Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) consider firms
with Wilson foresight. In this paper, we analyze the strength of the probationary
period as a screening device. We show that in such a case a) under Nash behavior,
low risks may prefer not to purchase any insurance at all in equilibrium and b)
under Wilson foresight, a pooling equilibrium may exist.
1 Introduction
In insurance markets with adverse selection and two diﬀerent risk types, insurers can
implement a screening tool to separate low risk and high risk individuals. The most com-
mon device is the monetary deductible. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that,
if this instrument is applied in a competitive market with Nash behavior, an equilibrium
exists if the proportion of high risks in a population exceeds a certain threshold. This
equilibrium, in the sequel called a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, is always of a separating
type. High risks buy full coverage and low risks buy partial coverage, both at actuarially
fair terms. Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) demonstrate that, in a competitive market
with Wilson foresight1, an equilibrium always exists. Like the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
derived in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), such an equilibrium is always of a separating
type, except that high risks may be subsidized by low risks. Crocker and Snow (1985)
∗Corresponding author. Email address p.m.karlsson@city.ac.uk
1Wilson foresight (see Wilson, 1977) implies that the insurance companies take into account that
existing contracts may be withdrawn as a result of a new contract under consideration.
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show that, according to the definition of eﬃciency developed in Harris and Townsend
(1981), such a Wilson-Miyazaki equilibrium is second best eﬃcient.
An alternative screening device, which will be the theme of this paper, is the proba-
tionary period. Such a device excludes coverage for events that occur during a predefined
period after the inception of the policy. The method, aiming to rule out preexisting con-
ditions, has found applications in some dental and medical policies. Besides, over recent
years it has gained popularity among Dutch group life companies, as a consequence of
new legislation concerning the medical examination of employees. By the new law which
came into force at the beginning of 1998, insurance companies are strongly restricted in
their possibilities to perform medical tests on individual members of a group life scheme.
A probationary period may then be an appropriate instrument to identify individuals who
are likely to make a claim soon after inception.
Several characteristics of the probationary period, like for example its implication for
the expected utility of consumers, have been investigated in Eeckhoudt et al. (1988). The
authors’ main conclusion is that most of the basic properties of the above mentioned mon-
etary deductibles do not carry over to probationary periods. For example, the equilibrium
on a competitive market (with symmetric information regarding risk class) is completely
ambiguous when there is a positive loading factor - as opposed to the monetary deductible
case where the optimal solution involves incomplete yet positive coverage. The reason be-
hind this result is that with a probationary period, it is not possible to rank diﬀerent
degrees of coverage according to their riskiness (in the sense of Rothschild & Stiglitz,
1970). Hence, preferences will typically exhibit non-convexities with regard to premium
rates and the period of probation.
Fluet (1992) applies the concept of a probationary period in a competitive insurance
market with asymmetric information and firms exhibiting Nash behavior. He adopts the
screening device of a time-dependent monetary deductible. Assuming that the proportion
of high risk agents is large enough, the high risks buy full coverage, while the low risks
buy partial coverage in monetary terms. The monetary deductible may vary over time
but is always positive. Hence, the contract with a pure probationary period can never
be an equilibrium, but a combination of an initial probationary period and subsequent
deductibles may well arise.
Fluet’s finding suggests a certain kind of inferiority of the probationary period as a
screening device, when compared with the monetary deductible. This has been confirmed
in Spreeuw (2005), who shows that using this instrument in a monopolistic insurance
market may lead to a pooling equilibrium, where both classes of risk buy full coverage.
This would never be possible with a monetary deductible, as shown in Stiglitz (1977).
This paper deals with a competitive insurance market and focuses on the probationary
period, rather than the monetary deductible, as an instrument to let individuals self-select.
In this respect, the approach is less general than Fluet (1992) as contracts incorporating
both time and monetary deductibles are not considered. It should be stated, however,
that a monetary deductible always implies some non-linear pricing which may be diﬃcult
to implement in practice. Moreover, Fluet (1992) has shown that the combination of
2
both devices makes it diﬃcult to draw conclusions, unless restricting assumptions are
being made. By concentrating on the probationary period, one can get an idea of possible
equilibria resulting if, just as in Fluet (1992), allowance is made for partial coverage
in monetary terms. We will, however, deal with both the cases of Nash behavior and
Wilson foresight. We will show that, in the former case, a separating equilibrium may be
degenerate even if the proportion of high risks is high, and in the latter case a pooling
equilibrium may exist.
The model is described in Section 2, where also the basic assumptions are listed and
the details about the main example in this paper are given. In Section 3, it is assumed that
firms are myopic in the sense that they do not take subsequent withdrawals of contracts
into account when designing policies. We will repeat a result obtained in Spreeuw (2005),
namely that, for full coverage the absolute value of the slope of any individual’s indiﬀerence
curve exceeds the firm’s corresponding marginal profit. This is an important property
which will be used throughout the remainder of the section. We show that if the low
risks’ probability of incurring a loss is high and the distinction between the high risks and
low risks is strong, the separating equilibrium will be degenerate in the sense that the low
risk type gets no insurance coverage at all. Such an equilibrium exists provided that the
share of high risks in the population is suﬃciently high.
Section 4 deals with Wilson foresight. There we show that, if the insurer’s strategy
is restricted to pooling contracts, full coverage may be optimal. This is a result which
contradicts Miyazaki’s and Spence’s findings. Finally, the restriction of oﬀering pooling
contracts only is dropped and hence the insurer can oﬀer any pair of policies. It is shown
that even then a pooling contract may be optimal. Under the assumptions stated in this
paper, such a pooling contract would involve complete coverage.
Conclusions are given in Section 5.
2 The basic assumptions and the nature of a proba-
tionary period
In this section we will start with an overview of the general assumptions and definitions
in Subsection 2.1. Thereafter, in Subsection 2.2, we will indicate the relationship between
the time-of-accident of the high risks and low risks and motivate our choice.
2.1 General assumptions
The basic assumptions are mainly derived from Fluet (1992). For the ease of exposition
they are listed below:
• A population consists of two risk classes, namely the high risks and the low risks. In
the remainder of this paper all variables pertaining to high risk and low risk individ-
uals will be accompanied by the subscripts H and L, respectively. All individuals
have an initial wealth equal to W .
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• All individuals within the population are identical, except with respect to the prob-
ability of having an accident in the period [0, n], where 0 is the current time. In case
an individual is faced with an accident, there is a monetary loss D. The probability
of having an accident for an individual of risk class i is denoted by ηi, i ∈ {H,L},
with ηL < ηH < 1. It is assumed that an accident can occur to each individual at
most once.
• All risks are insurable.
• The population consists ofN individuals, of whichNH andNL belong to the category
of high risks and low risks respectively. Hence N = NH + NL. The proportion of
high risks among the entire population is denoted by ρ, so NH = ρN .
• The time at which any accident occurs is perfectly observable by both the individual
concerned and the company.
• The probability for an individual of risk class i, i ∈ {H,L}, of facing an accident
before time t (0 ≤ t ≤ n) is denoted by Fi(t) (hence Fi(n) = ηi), and it is assumed
to be diﬀerentiable in [0, n], with derivative fi(t) > 0, ∀t ∈ [0, n]. All individuals
fully know these probabilities. These probabilities are exogenous, so that the risk
of moral hazard is non-existent.
• To each individual, the same utility function U(·) applies, which is assumed to be
increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and independent of
time.
• Insurance companies are risk neutral profit maximizers and can oﬀer any set of
contracts which result in a nonnegative expected profit.
• There are no transaction costs involved in the supply of insurance and no administra-
tive costs for the insurance business. Nor are there costs of obtaining classification
information on a potential insured when it is possible to do so.
• Contracts are specified by (t, P ), with t and P denoting the probationary period
and the premium respectively. For the given contract, no indemnity is paid if an
accident occurs in the period [0, t], nor will the premium P , to be paid at time 0, be
refunded to the insured. On the other hand, if an accident occurs during the period
(t, n], the insured will get a benefit equal to D (= loss).
• We denote the expected utility resulting from taking out the policy (t, P ) byEi (t, P ).
This implies:
Ei (t, P ) = Fi (t)U (W − P −D) + (1− Fi (t))U (W − P ) ; i ∈ {H,L} . (1)
The special case case of no insurance is denoted by Ei, so:
Ei = Ei (n, 0) = ηiU (W −D) + (1− ηi)U (W ) , i ∈ {H,L} . (2)
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2.2 Relationship between distribution functions of time-of-loss
We have already defined FH(t) and FL(t), the c.d.f.’s of time of loss, in the previous
subsection. We will now establish a relationship between those functions by assuming
that the ratio between FH(t) and FL(t) is defined by the function b (t), i.e.:
FH (t) = b (t)FL (t) , with b (t) > 1; 0 ≤ t ≤ n (3)
where b (t) is a real valued and diﬀerentiable function.
Remark 1 Assumption (3) is less restrictive than (and hence implied by) the assumption
made by Fluet (1992) that the high risk type has a higher hazard rate for each t ∈ [0, n]
This strict inequality between FH (t) and FL (t) ensures that all contracts which will
be purchased by the low risks are also acceptable for the high risks. Consider the contract
(t, P ). Then, for b (t) monotone non-decreasing, we have:
EH (t, P )− EH
= U (W − P )− U (W )
+b (t)FL (t) (U (W − P −D)− U (W − P ))
−b (n) ηL (U (W −D)− U (W ))
> U (W − P )− U (W )
+FL (t) (U (W − P −D)− U (W − P ))
−ηL (U (W −D)− U (W ))
= EL (t, P )− EL
≥ 0. (4)
Remark 2 If we allow for the function b (t) to be decreasing for some t ∈ [0, n], there
may be cases where inequality (4) does not hold.
2.3 Details about the examples
Throughout the paper, we will use examples to illustrate the implications of our findings.
These examples are all based on the same specifications concerning the utility functions
of the individuals. We assume it to be within the CARA class; more specifically the
exponential function
U (x) = −αe−αx. (5)
We use the following numbers for the numerical illustrations: α = 0.00001, D =
200, 000. Findings depend on α and D only through αD.
In the examples, we also assume that the diﬀerence between the two groups of con-
sumers is constant in t, hence b (t) = b. Concerning the time of loss function FL (t) is
is actually not necessary to specify any functional form apart from the obvious fact that
fL (t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, n].
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3 Nash behavior
In this section, we work with the assumption that insurance companies are myopic in the
sense that they do not take potential withdrawals of competitors’ contracts into account
when oﬀering policies. We will show that a separating equilibrium, if it exists, may
have quite diﬀerent properties from the equilibrium in the monetary deductible case.
Finally, we analyze the existence of diﬀerent types of equilibria with an exponential utility
function.
3.1 Indiﬀerence curves and iso-profit curves
In this subsection we will show that, at any point of full coverage, an individual’s marginal
rate of substitution of premium for time deductible exceeds the firm’s marginal profit.
Recall that, in case of a monetary deductible, these two quantities are always equal to
each other.
We define Γ (t, P ) as the expected profit resulting from oﬀering a contract (t, P ) to an
individual. This gives
Γ (t, P ) = P − (η − F (t))D. (6)
The marginal profit, in terms of the probationary period, is equal to
∂Γ (t, P )
dt
= f (t)D. (7)
The individual’s marginal rate of substitution of premium for probationary period (the
slope of the indiﬀerence curve) is equal to
−dP
dt
= f (t)
U (W − P )− U (W − P −D)
F (t)U 0 (W − P −D) + (1− F (t))U 0 (W − P ) . (8)
For t = 0 (full coverage), appealing to the strict concavity of U (·), this leads to
−
µ
dP
dt
¶
(t=0)
= f (0)
U (W − P )− U (W − P −D)
U 0 (W − P ) > f (0)D. (9)
This inequality follows because the introduction of a positive probationary period intro-
duces a wedge between the utility experienced during the probationary period (in the
event of an accident) and the utility experienced afterwards. The actuarially fair pre-
mium moves smoothly around t = 0, however. This result suggests that the eﬀectiveness
of the probationary period as a screening device can be quite poor. We will use this result
in the next sections.
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3.2 The Nash Equilibrium
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that, if all firms in the insurance market are
myopic and the proportion of high risks exceeds a certain level, a Cournot-Nash separating
equilibrium exists. High risks buy full insurance while the policy for the low risks is subject
to a monetary deductible.
In this section we will show that, with the probationary period as a screening device,
a separating Cournot-Nash equilibrium may involve having low risks purchasing no insur-
ance at all, no matter what the proportion of high risks is. Such an equilibrium would
involve the contract (0, ηHD) for the high risks (i.e. full coverage, at an actuarially fair
premium), in combination with a certain contract (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D) (partial coverage
at an actuarially fair premium) for the low risks.
The latter contract satisfies both the self-selection constraint for the high risks
U (W − ηHD) ≥ EH (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D) , (10)
and the reservation constraint for the low risks
EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D) ≥ EL. (11)
Taking the low type’s marginal utility with respect to the probationary period, we get
d
EL (tL, PL (tL))
dtL
= fL (tL)D
· {FL (tL)U 0 (W − PL (tL)−D) + (1− FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL (tL))
− U (W − PL (tL))− U (W − PL (tL)−D)
D
¾
. (12)
So that the individual trades oﬀ the increase in utility due to a reduction in the premium
(the first term in equation 12) against the negative utility loss due to reduced coverage
(the second term). Let β (·) be a real valued function, such that 0 ≤ β (tL) ≤ D for any
tL ∈ [0, n]. Consequently:
U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D −D) ≤ U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D − β (tL))
≤ U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D) . (13)
where we make use of the definition of the actuarially fair contract: PL (tL) = (ηL − FL (tL))D.
Then, according to the mean value theorem, equation (12) can be rewritten as:
d
EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D)
dtL
= fL (tL)D
· {FL (tL)U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D −D) + (1− FL (tL)U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D))
− U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D − β (tL))} , (14)
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For tL = n, equation (14) reduces to:µ
d
EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D)
dtL
¶
(tL=n)
= fL (n)D (ηLU
0 (W −D) + (1− ηL)U 0 (W )− U 0 (W − β (n))) . (15)
For large ηL, this derivative is positive, indicating that in such cases the individual prefers
no insurance to coverage with a long probationary period. Hence, for tL in a neighborhood
of n, and a relatively smooth behavior of FL (tL), the derivative in (14) will be positive
as well. So there are at least some actuarially fair contracts which a low risk will not
purchase. Now consider equation (10), recalling that ηH = b (n) ηL. The greater b (n),
the higher the premium for the high risks and the longer the probationary period for the
low risks. Note that for b (n) = 1ηL (the maximum value b (n) can take), the high risk
individual is indiﬀerent between full insurance and no insurance, as shown in Eeckhoudt
et al. (1988) and therefore there will be no coverage for the low risks. Hence, the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 For suﬃciently high ηL and b (n), the separating equilibrium will involve low
risks purchasing no insurance at all, whereas high risks purchase complete coverage.
This result is diﬀerent from the monetary deductible case, where the low risks always
get some, albeit incomplete, coverage. It should be noted that this result does not depend
qualitatively on the sign of the derivative b0 (t). In general, for b0 (t) < 0, the probationary
period becomes more eﬃcient as a screening device as the self-selection constraint (10)
is less costly to satisfy when high risks have proportionately more mass concentrated in
the beginning. When the shadow cost of the self-selection constraint decreases, the low
risk type will be more likely to prefer the separating menu over no coverage at all. The
conclusion in Lemma 3 still holds, however, since a high value of ηL implies that b
0 (t)
must be relatively small in absolute value. Furthermore, our conclusion will not be altered
even if inequality (4) is reversed for some t ∈ [0, n] when b0 (t) < 0. The reason is that,
unless a degenerate separating equilibrium occurs, the self-selection constraint of the high
risk type will be binding in equilibrium. If this would not be the case, the low risk type
would opt for full coverage (tL = 0); i.e. a contract that will always be preferred by the
high risk type, irrespective of the shape of the b (t) function.
It remains to be shown that the separating equilibrium actually exists, however. Since
the equilibrium we have sketched above is the most preferred separating equilibrium,
we only need to ensure that there is no pooling contract that can attract both types of
clients and make non-negative profits. Such a contract would need to be preferred over no
insurance by the low risk type, and preferred to the actuarially fair full coverage contract
by the high risk type. Just as in Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976), the profitability of such a
pooling contract is decreasing in the share of high risk types (ρ) and hence the degenerate
separating equilibrium we have sketched above only exists provided that the share of high
risk types is suﬃciently high.
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3.2.1 Example: The exponential utility function
For illustrative purposes, we now use the specification of the utility function provided
in subsection 2.3. It transpires, however, that even with this simple specification of the
utility function, it is not possible to find analytical solutions to the problem that deter-
mine parameter values for which the diﬀerent types of equilibria arise. What we can do,
however, is, firstly to derive parameter values for which the equilibrium is unambiguously
of one type or the other (with an ambiguous region in between) and, secondly, to use
simulation techniques to arrive at a complete partitioning of the parameter space. All
proofs concerning the analytical results will be provided in the appendix.
First, we define the regions for which analytical solutions are attainable. A useful
finding in this endeavour is that no interior extreme point will be a maximum; hence,
there are only two points to compare in order to determine which equilibrium arises:
tL = n and tL = etL, where etL is defined according to the self selection constraint of the
high risk type:
eαηHD = eα(ηL−FL(
etL))D £bFL ¡etL¢ ¡eαD − 1¢+ 1¤ (16)
It can be shown that etL is unique. This property will also be important in the analysis
of the Wilson case in section 4 below.
For the degenerate case, we look at regions of the parameters where the low risk’s
utility is increasing over all the values of tL that are admissible according to the self
selection constraint. In such a case, the equilibrium will clearly have to be degenerate (if
it exists). For the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz type of equilibrium, we look for parameter
values for which the marginal utility at tL = n is non-positive. Whenever this condition
is fulfilled, it follows from the shape of the second derivative that the utility of the low
risk type is decreasing for the entire interval tL ∈
¡etL, n¢. Accordingly, we can establish
the following lemma:
Lemma 4 For ηL ≥ η∗L, the equilibrium strategy, if it exists, is to oﬀer only the contract
(0, ηHD) (degenerate equilibrium) whereas for ηL ≤ η˜L it is optimal to oﬀer the contracts
(0, ηHD) and
¡etL, ¡ηL − FL ¡etL¢¢D¢ (standard equilibrium), where etL is defined by equa-
tion (16) and the cutoﬀ points of ηL are defined as follows:
η∗L =
³
ln
³
αD
b(eαD−1)(b−1)αD
´
− 1
´ ¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ αD
(eαD − 1) (b− 1)αD (17)
η˜L =
1
αD
− 1
(eαD − 1) (18)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Hence, this lemma leaves a certain region of parameter values ambiguous in terms
of the equilibrium that prevails. For a complete partitioning of the parameter space by
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equilibrium type, we would need to have an explicit solution for t˜L. This is not possible,
since it contains Lambert’s W function that does not have analytical solutions:
FL
¡
t˜L
¢
= −
b
¡
eαD − 1
¢
LambertW
µ
− αD
b(eαD−1) exp
µ
αD
bηL(eαD−1)(b−1)
b(eαD−1)
¶¶
+ αD
b (eαD − 1)αD (19)
where LambertW signifies Lambert’s W function, i.e. the solution to z =W (z) eW (z),
defined for z ∈
¡
−1
e
,∞
¢
. By means of the algorithm provided by Corless et al (1996),
we can simulate the value of FL
¡
t˜L
¢
for a range of parameter values. Some examples are
provided in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Critical values for the probationary period.
The full curve shows values of FL
¡
t˜L
¢
when b, the risk markup of the high risk type
equals 2. Quite intuitively, a higher value of b allows for lower values of t˜L (mimicking
the low risk type is less appealing), which is also reflected in the figure.
Finally, we use the simulated values from Figure 1 in order to partition the parameter
space according to the diﬀerent equilibria. First, however, we establish the conditions for
existence:
Lemma 5 A separating Nash equilibrium only exists if
ρ >
ln
¡
ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
− ηLαD
ηLαD (b− 1)
(20)
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and a degenerate equilibrium only exists is
ρ >
ln
¡
FL
¡etL¢ ¡eαD − 1¢+ 1¢− FL ¡etL¢αD
ηLαD (b− 1)
(21)
Proof. See appendix B.
The simulation results are presented in Figure 2. Just as we established in Lemma 3,
the Nash equilibrium involves low risk types not purchasing any insurance at all for high
values of ηL and b.
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
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0.5
0.6
0.7
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b
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Standard RS Equilibrium
Degenerate
         Equilibrium
No
Equilibrium
Figure 2: Equilibrium Types, Nash Case. Rho = 0.25
4 Wilson foresight
If firms behave with Wilson foresight, an equilibrium, based on maximal welfare for the
low risks always exists. In this section, we show that such an equilibrium may be of a
pooling type. We also provide some examples for the exponential utility function.
4.1 Optimal pooling contract
Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) have shown that, for the monetary deductible as a
screening device the equilibrium is always of a separating type. Firstly, from the insurer’s
point of view, a pooling strategy without full coverage will always be inferior to oﬀering
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a pair of diﬀerent contracts, with the original pooling contract designed for the low risks
and full coverage for the high risks.
Secondly, a pooling strategy can never involve complete coverage. In case of pooling,
the low risks would pay a loaded premium for constant b. As discussed for example in
Arrow (1963) and Pashigian et al. (1966), full insurance cannot be optimal if a premium
is loaded. This point is also stressed in Eeckhoudt et al. (1988).
In this subsection, we will concentrate on the latter conclusion. We show that, with
the probationary period as screening device, oﬀering full coverage could provide the low
risks with optimal welfare if the firms’ choice were restricted to selling pooling contracts.
Assume that the insurer can only oﬀer a pooling contract (t, P ) . Let’s denote the
objective function by bVL (t, P ), which is defined as the expected utility for a low risk type
agent resulting from oﬀering such a contract. Then we have
bVL (t, P ) = FL (t)U (W − P −D) + (1− FL (t))U (W − P ) . (22)
Such contracts satisfy the binding non-profit constraint:
P = (ρ (b (0) ηL − b (t)FL (t)) + (1− ρ) (ηL − FL (t)))D. (23)
So we can express P as a function of t. We will use the notation P (t) and, consequently,bVL (t) to denote bVL (t, P ) in (22) expressed as a function of t only:
bVL (t) = FL (t)U (W − P (t)−D) + (1− FL (t))U (W − P (t)) . (24)
We analyze the function (24) by taking its derivative with respect to t. This returns:
d
bVL (t)
dt
= −fL (t) (U (W − P (t))− U (W − P (t)−D))
−dP (t)
dt
(FL (t)U
0 (W − P (t)−D) + (1− FL (t))U 0 (W − P (t)))
= fL (t)
½µ
ρ
µ
b (t)− 1 + b
0 (t)FL (t)
fL (t)
¶
+ 1
¶
D
µ
FL (t)U
0 (W − P (t)−D)
+ (1− FL (t))U 0 (W − P (t))
¶
− (U (W − P (t))− U (W − P (t)−D))} . (25)
In accordance with the mean value theorem:
U (W − P (t))− U (W − P (t)−D)
D
= U 0 (W − P (t)− β (t)) , (26)
for some β (t) ∈ [0,D] , t ∈ [0, n]. Note that, compared to the previous subsection, P is
a function of t, so β is a function of t as well. Consequently:
U 0 (W − P (t)−D) ≤ U 0 (W − P (t)− β (t)) ≤ U 0 (W − P (t)) . (27)
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So we can rewrite (25) as
d
bVL (t)
dt
= fL (t)D½µ
ρ
µ
b (t)− 1 + b
0 (t)FL (t)
fL (t)
¶
+ 1
¶µ
FL (t)U
0 (W − P (t)−D)
+ (1− FL (t))U 0 (W − P (t))
¶
−U 0 (W − P (t)− β (t))} . (28)
For t = 0, expression (28) reduces toÃ
d
bV (t)
dt
!
(t=0)
= fL (0)D {(ρ (b (0)− 1) + 1)U 0 (W − P (0))− U 0 (W − P (0)− β (0))} ,
(29)
which is negative for ρ = 0 or b (0) = 1. By continuity, it is therefore negative at t = 0 for
ρ and b (t) in a neighborhood of 0 and 1, respectively. This implies that, for such values
of ρ or b (0), the pooling contract with complete coverage is at least not the worst among
all the pooling contracts. Recall that, for the monetary deductible as a screening device,
the above expression is always positive, so complete coverage can never be optimal.
Furthermore, note that if ηL is small, then FL (t) is small for each t ∈ [0, n] and hence,
again by continuity, we have for each t ∈ [0, n]:
U 0 (W − P (t)− β (t)) ≥ FL (t)U 0 (W − P (t)−D) + (1− FL (t))U 0 (W − P (t)) . (30)
For b0 (t) < 0, this inequality implies that d
bV (t)
dt
is negative everywhere for ρ and b (t)
in a neighborhood of 0 and 1, respectively. Even if b0 (t) > 0, the term b
0(t)FL(t)
fL(t)
in equation
(29) is small whenever ηL is small. It follows that the best pooling strategy may be indeed
to provide full coverage.
Of course, the insurer’s choice is not restricted to pooling contracts; the general case
where the insurer can oﬀer any pair of policies, is dealt with in the next section.
4.2 The equilibrium
Obviously, the low risks’ opportunities for a higher welfare are enhanced if, unlike the
previous subsection, its choice is not restricted to pooling contracts.
Note that, just as in Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978),
• any contract acceptable for the low risk is also acceptable for the high risks (as
follows from equation (3)), and
• complete coverage is optimal in case of symmetric information (as shown in Eeck-
houdt et al. (1988)).
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This implies that, again just as in Stiglitz, (1977), any strategy of oﬀering a pooling
contract with incomplete coverage to both risk types is inferior to oﬀering the original
pooling contract to the low risks and full coverage to the high risks.
Definition 6 The Wilson Equilibrium is a set of contracts (0, PH) and (tL, PL) that max-
imizes expected welfare of the low risk type EL (tL, PL), subject to the following constraints:
EH (0, PH) ≥ EH (tL, PL) (31)
ρ (PH − ηHD) + (1− ρ) (PL − (ηL − FL (tL))D) = 0 (32)
PH − ηHD ≤ 0 (33)
tL ∈ [0, n] (34)
It should be noted that the above constraints allow for a pooling equilibrium, since if
we impose tL = 0 and PH = PL, constraint (31) above becomes an identity. Considering
the three first constraints, two of them are relatively straightforward since they require
self-selection by the high risk type (31) and non-negative profits (32), respectively. The
third constraint (33) states that the contract oﬀered to the high risk type in equilibrium
may not earn positive profits. This constraint is required since otherwise a competitor
could oﬀer a contract that generates slightly lower profits, that attracts the high risk
types, and that remains profitable once the original set of contracts has been withdrawn.
It follows from a similar argument that the overall profit constraint has to be binding
with equality.
In what follows, we will denote a set of contracts feasible if it satisfies the three
constraints in Definition 6.
The Lagrangian to be optimized has the following shape:
L = EL (tL, PL) + λ1 {EH (0, PH)−EH (tL, PL)}
+λ2 {ρ (PH − b (n) ηLD) + (1− ρ) (PL − (ηL − FL (tL))D)}+ λ3 {b (n) ηLD − PH}
−λ4 (tL − n)− λ5tL (35)
In (35), the Lagrange multiplier λ1 applies to the self-selection constraint for the high
risks, the multiplier λ2 corresponds to the nonnegative profit constraint for the firm and
the multiplier λ3 corresponds to the cross-subsidization constraint. Finally, the multipliers
λ4 and λ5 refer to the condition that tL ∈ [0, n].
Next, we analyze the properties of potential Wilson equilibria in two diﬀerent steps.
First, we carry out local analysis in the neighborhood of tL = 0 in order to find out under
what circumstances the pooling contract is locally preferred to the separating contracts.
Secondly, we look at more general properties of the potential Wilson equilibria.
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4.2.1 Local Analysis
Notice that the pooling contract outlined above satisfies all of the constraints, and has
constraint (33) satisfied with inequality as long as ρ < 1. Hence we have λ3 = 0 in
a neighborhood of tL = 0. Logically, we have λ4 = 0 and λ5 = 0 as well. Then the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be simplified as
∂L
∂PH
= λ2 ρ− λ1U 0 (W − PH) (36)
∂L
∂PL
= −FL (tL)U 0 (W − PL −D)− (1− FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL) (37)
+λ1 (b (tL)FL (tL)U 0 (W − PL −D) + (1− b (tL)FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL))
+λ2 (1− ρ)
∂L
∂tL
= fL (tL) (U (W − PL −D)− U (W − PL)) (38)
−λ1 (b (tL) fL (tL) + b0 (tL)FL (tL)) (U (W − PL −D)− U (W − PL))
+λ2 (1− ρ) fL (tL)D
Using the conditions (36) and (37) we can solve for the Lagrange multipliers:
λ1 =
ρ (FL (tL)U 0 (W − PL −D) + (1− FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL))
g (tL)
(39)
λ2 =
(FL (tL)U
0 (W − PL −D) + (1− FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL))U 0 (W − PH)
g (tL)
(40)
where
g (tL) = U
0 (W − PL) (1− ρ) + ρFL (tL) b (tL)U 0 (W − PL −D)
+ρ (1− b (tL)FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL) . (41)
Using the mean value theorem, condition (38) simplifies to:
∂L
∂tL
= fL (tL)D
∙µ
λ1
µ
b (tL) +
b0 (tL)FL (tL)
fL (tL)
¶
− 1
¶
U 0 (W − PL − β (tL)) + λ2 (1− ρ)
¸
(42)
And if we insert the multipliers, we get
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∂L
∂tL
¯¯¯¯
tL=0
=
fL (0)DU
0 (W − PL)
∙
(1− ρ) (U 0 (W − PL)− U 0 (W − PL − β))
+ρ (b (0)− 1)U 0 (W − PL − β)
¸
g (0)
(43)
The first term in the bracket is clearly negative, whereas the other one is positive but
has an upper bound. The entire expression is increasing in ρ and in b (0). Hence, for low
values of ρ and b (0), the expression will be negative, implying that the pooling contract
is preferred to some feasible separating contracts in the neighborhood of tL = 0.
Lemma 7 For low values of ρ and b (0), the pooling contract provides the low risk type
with higher expected welfare than at least some of the feasible separating menus.
4.2.2 Global Analysis
In order to drawmore general conclusions concerning the properties of potential equilibria,
it is useful to assume constraints binding and then inserting them into the Lagrangian.
In this subsection, we start out assuming that constraint (31) is binding, as it is in a
neighborhood of tL = 0 onwards. Then we analyze the alternative setting where constraint
(33) is binding, as it might eventually. Our aim is to analyze for what parameter values the
potential equilibria in the two settings have similar properties, so that general conclusions
may be drawn.
If initially we assume that constraint (31) is binding in equilibrium, we may express the
objective function in terms of only one of the variables tL, PL or PH just by substituting
(31) and (32) into (35). In the same way as in the previous section, we will express it as
a function of tL only. Likewise, PL is a function of tL, so we will use the notation PL (tL).
Denote the low risks’ welfare function by bVL (tL). Then, substitution leads to:bVL (tL) = EL (PL (tL) , tL) , (44)
with the relationship between PL and tL shown as:
U
µ
W − b (tL) ηLD +
(1− ρ)
ρ
(PL − (ηL − FL (tL))D)
¶
= b (tL)FL (tL)U (W − PL −D) + (1− b (tL)FL (tL))U (W − PL) . (45)
This leads to:
dbVL (tL)
dtL
=
µ
−dPL (tL)
dtL
¶
(FL (tL)U
0 (W − PL (tL)−D) + (1− FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL (tL)))
−fL (tL) (U (W − PL (tL))− U (W − PL (tL)−D)) , (46)
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with µ
−dPL (tL)
dtL
¶
=
h (tL)
k (tL)
. (47)
In (47),
h (tL) = ((1− ρ) fL (tL)D − ρb0 (tL)) · U 0
µ
W − b (tL) ηLD +
(1− ρ)
ρ
(PL − (ηL − FL (tL))D)
¶
+ ρ (b (tL) fL (tL) + FL (tL) b0 (tL)) (U (W − PL (tL))− U (W − PL (tL)−D)) ,
(48)
and
k (tL) = (1− ρ)U 0
µ
W − b (tL) ηLD +
(1− ρ)
ρ
(PL − (ηL − FL (tL))D)
¶
+ρ
µ
b (tL)FL (tL)U
0 (W − PL (tL)−D)
+ (1− b (tL)FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL (tL))
¶
. (49)
By defining
g (tL) = FL (tL)U
0 (W − PL (tL)−D) + (1− FL (tL))U 0 (W − PL (tL)) (50)
equation (46) reduces, after some rewriting to:
dbVL (tL)
dtL
=
fL (tL)D
k (tL)
·
½
U 0
µ
W − b (tL) ηLD +
(1− ρ)
ρ
(PL − (ηL − FL (tL))D)
¶
·
µµ
1− ρ
µ
1 +
b0 (tL)
fL (tL)
¶¶
g (tL)− (1− ρ)U 0 (W − PL (tL)− β (tL))
¶
+ρ ((b (tL)− 1)U 0 (W − PL)U 0 (W − PL (tL)− β (tL)) + b0 (tL)FL (tL) g (tL))} , (51)
for some β (tL) ∈ [0,D]. Now consider the expression between the curly brackets of
(51), which apparently determines the sign of the derivative. The first term in the curly
brackets reflects the trade-oﬀ between the utility that the low risk type looses due to an
extension of the probationary period, and the potential gain from a reduction in premium
rates that such an extension may cause. For a small value of ηL, the value of FL (tL) will
be small as well. It follows that the ’premium reduction’ eﬀect will be relatively small
compared with the ’reduced coverage’ eﬀect (i.e. the indiﬀerence curves of the low risk
type are relatively steep). Hence, if b0 (tL) > 0 and ηL small, the first term in the curly
brackets will be negative for all tL ∈ [0, n].
The second and the third terms, on the other hand, represent the shadow cost of the
high risk type’s self-selection constraint. If ηL is low, the third term becomes insignificant
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(since both FL (tL) and g (tL) are relatively small in this case). The second term, on the
other hand, is positive but has an upper bound. For low values of ρ, however, this term
becomes relatively insignificant as well. It follows that as long as b0 (tL) > 0, suﬃciently
small values of ρ and ηL will imply that derivative (51) is negative for all tL ∈ [0, n] and
hence the pooling contract may be a Wilson equilibrium.
To establish this result, however, we need to consider what happens if constraint (33)
is binding instead. Such an equilibrium may come about and, as noticed by Harris and
Townsend (1981), the set of equilibria that arise coincide with the corresponding Nash
equilibria. Hence, from Section 3 we know that the derivative of the low risk type’s utility
with respect to the probationary period is:
d
EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D)
dtL
= fL (tL)D
· {FL (tL)U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D −D) + (1− FL (tL)U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D))
− U 0 (W − (ηL − FL (tL))D − β (tL))} , (52)
Comparing equation (51) with equation (52), we notice that both are negative for
suﬃciently small values of ρ and ηL. Hence, we may state the following lemma.
Lemma 8 For b0 (t) ≥ 0, ρ and ηL suﬃciently small, the pooling contract may provide
the low risks with maximal welfare.
Now consider the case where b0 (t) < 0. In this case, the sign of equation (51) is more
ambiguous, and it is not possible to extend the conclusions of Lemma 8 to this case. For
certain parameter values, a pooling equilibrium may still be possible. We can make the
same observation as in Section 3, however, i.e. that when b0 (t) < 0, the probationary
period is a more eﬃcient screening device, and hence a separating equilibrium is more
likely.
4.2.3 An example: the exponential utility function
Again, we use the exponential utility function outlined in subsection 2.3. For the Wilson
case, there are actually four diﬀerent types of equilibria that can arise, depending on the
parameter values. Hence, the equilibrium may involve any of the following:
• The pooling contract (0, ρbηLD + (1− ρ) ηLD)
• Separating contracts without cross-subsidization: (0, bηLD),
¡
t˜L,
¡
ηL − FL
¡
t˜L
¢¢
D
¢
(with t˜L defined by equation (16) above).
• Separating contracts with cross-subsidization: (0, P ∗H), (t∗L, P ∗L)
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• Degenerate equilibrium: contract (0, bηLD) only
Among the possible equilibria listed above, three correspond to corner solutions: con-
sistently with the argument in subsection 3.2.1 above, a separating menu without cross-
subsidization cannot be an interior solution since the second derivative of the low risk
type’s utility function is positive at any extreme point. Hence, only the separating con-
tract with cross-subsidization is based on an interior solution for t∗L. The contracts oﬀered
in that case are defined by
t∗L = F
−1
L
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1− ρ)
¡
b
¡
eαD − 1
¢
− (b+ 1)
¡
eαD − 1
¢¢
−q
(1− ρ) [(b− 1)αD − b (eαD − 1)]2 − ρ [(b− 1)αD + b (eαD − 1)]2
2 (eαD − 1) (1− ρ) bαD
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(53)
P ∗L = ρ
µ
bηLD +
1− ρ
ρ
(ηL − FL (t∗L))D −
1
α
ln
¡
bFL (t
∗
L)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢¶
(54)
P ∗H = bηLD −
1− ρ
ρ
(P ∗L − (ηL − FL (t∗L))D) (55)
The equilibrium with cross-subsidization is only possible in case b, the diﬀerence be-
tween the two risk groups, is large enough - hence implying that it is beneficial for the
low risk group to subsidize the high risk group in order to reduce the probationary period
tL. This threshold, b∗, equals:
b∗ =
αD
eαD − 1− αD (56)
which depends on α, the absolute risk aversion parameter, and D, the size of the loss,
only.
In general, we have that for high values of ρ, the separating equilibrium without cross-
subsidization will prevail. This is down to the fact that when the proportion of high risks
in the population is particularly high, eﬃciency would require redistribution from the high
risk to the low risk. This possibility is ruled out by constraint (33), however. The pooling
equilibrium, on the other hand, arises for low values of ρ. This is the opposite situation
where the high risks represent such a low proportion of the population that the welfare
loss due to subsidization is very small compared to the gains from having no probationary
period at all. In between these two scenarios, there may be separating contracts with
cross-subsidization.
The exact conditions for the various equilibria are provided in the Appendix. Here,
we will simply make use of the algorithm introduced in subsection 3.2.1 in order to derive
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some pictorial representations of the diﬀerent equilibria. In Figure 32 we partition the
parameter space by equilibrium type when ρ = 0.25. Just as we established in Lemma 8,
the pooling equilibrium is more likely the lower is the value of ηL.
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ηL
Separating without CSPooling
Degenerate
ηLb = 1
Figure 3: Equilibrium Types, Wilson Case. Rho equals 0.25
Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 4, that is based on ρ = 0.75, we can also confirm
that the area where pooling equilibria arise is shrinking in ρ.
5 Conclusions and final remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the eﬀectiveness of a probationary period as a screen-
ing device in an insurance market with adverse selection problems. In general, we find
evidence that the probationary period is a relatively poor instrument, and this finding
seems to be robust to varying assumptions on the extent of forward-looking behaviour on
the part of the insurance companies.
Accordingly, we find that the Cournot-Nash separating equilibrium, if it exists, may
entail no insurance coverage at all for the low risks. This outcome is quite diﬀerent from
the equilibrium derived in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), where low risks always get some
degree of coverage. This degenerate equilibrium comes about if the low risks’ probability
of incurring an accident is large, and the diﬀerence between the low risks’ and the high
2The region denoted ’Separating without CS’ shows the parameter values for which a separating
equilibrium without cross-subsidisation occurs.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Types, Wilson Case. Rho equals 0.75
risks’ probability is large as well. The general conditions for existence of an equilibrium
are quite similar to those found by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), i.e. that the proportion
of high risks in the population is suﬃciently high.
Moreover we find that, in contradiction to the findings in Miyazaki (1977) and Spence
(1978), a pooling contract with complete coverage may provide the low risks more welfare
than any other pooling contract. Oﬀering such a contract may even be more beneficial to
this class of risk than oﬀering any set of separating policies. A strategy involving a pooling
full coverage contract can be Pareto-eﬃcient if the low risk’s probability of incurring an
accident, the diﬀerences between the low risks’ and the high risks’ probabilities, as well
as the proportion of high risks within the entire population are all relatively low. This
is a remarkable finding as the assumptions of the model imply that the single-crossing
property in the (t, P ) space is always satisfied.
In fact, our conclusions show consistency with the findings in Fluet (1992). Consider
a contract with a probationary period only. Then the monetary deductible is equal to
the loss during that period and zero thereafter. Apparently, in many cases this maximal
diﬀerence between the deductibles does not work out very well for the individual. Fluet has
shown that any time-dependent monetary deductible for the low risks is always strictly
positive. It is interesting to note that, in case FH (t) = bFL (t) (as considered in the
examples this paper), Fluet establishes that the monetary deductible for the low risks is
constant over time. This implies that the separating menu does not involve a probationary
period. Fluet only considers the case of Nash behavior in detail. However, he rightly points
out in his concluding remarks that the low risks will purchase the same type of contract
21
if firms behave with Wilson foresight.
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A Proof of Lemma 4
First we establish that no interior contracts, with tL ∈
¡
t˜L, n
¢
can be oﬀered in equi-
librium. First consider the utility of the low risk type from a certain actuarially fair
contract:
EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D) = −αe−α(W−(ηL−FL(tL))D)
£¡
eαD − 1
¢
FL (tL) + 1
¤
(57)
Taking the derivative with respect to tL, we get:
∂EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D)
∂tL
= αfL (tL) e−α(W−(ηL−FL(tL))D)
¡
(αDFL (tL)− 1)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ αD
¢
(58)
And the second derivative equals:
∂2EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D)
∂ (tL)
2 =
f 0L (tL)
fL (tL)
∂EL
∂tL
+ (αfL (tL))
2De−α(W−(ηL−FL(tL))D) ·¡
(2− αDFL (tL))
¡
eαD − 1
¢
− αD
¢
(59)
from which follows that ∂EL(tL,(ηL−FL(tL))D)∂tL ⇒
∂2EL(tL,(ηL−FL(tL))D)
∂(tL)
2 > 0; hence, no
interior extreme point can be a maximum. Accordingly, we need to compare the low risk
type’s utility from contract
¡
t˜L,
¡
ηL − FL
¡
t˜L
¢¢
D
¢
with the utility of no insurance at all,
EL.
A condition for the former to be preferred is
eα(ηL−FL(t˜L))D
£¡
eαD − 1
¢
FL
¡
t˜L
¢
+ 1
¤
<
¡
eαD − 1
¢
ηL + 1 (60)
For
ηL ≤
1
αD
− 1
eαD − 1 (61)
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the LHS of (60) is increasing in t˜L and reaches a maximum at t˜L = n. Hence, for
ηL < η˜L, the inequality (60) holds for sure and the resulting equilibrium will be the
standard separating type.
Next, define btL by ∂EL(tL,(ηL−FL(tL))D)∂tL ¯¯¯tL=btL = 0. It follows that if btL < t˜L, ∂EL(tL,(ηL−FL(tL))D)∂tL
¯¯¯
tL=t˜L
>
0, and hence the only admissible equilibrium (since interior maxima do not exist) is the
degenerate one where tL = n. A suﬃcient condition for btL < t˜L is that
ηL ≥
³
ln
³
αD
b(eαD−1−αD)+αD
´
− 1
´ ¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ αD
(eαD − 1) (b− 1)αD (62)
which completes the proof.¥
B Proof of Lemma 5
The actuarially fair pooling contract will have premium rate
P = (1− ρ (1− b)) (ηL − FL (t))D (63)
Existence of the degenerate equilibrium then requires
EH (0, bηLD) ≥ EH (t, P ) (64)
EL (n, 0) ≥ EL (t, P ) (65)
Notably, we have established already that EL (n, 0) ≥ EL (t, (ηL − FL (tL))D) for all
tL ∈
£etL, n¤. Since P > (ηL − FL (tL))D it follows that inequality (65) holds with in-
equality for t ∈
£etL, n¤. Hence, any pooling contract able to destabilize the equilibrium
will have t ∈
£
0,etL¢. Now consider the derivative of the two risk types’ expected utility
from the pooling contract with respect to t.
EL (t, P ) = −
¡
FL (t)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
αe−α(W−(1−ρ(1−b))(ηL−FL(t))D) (66)
∂EL (t, P )
∂t
= fL (t)αe−α(W−(1−ρ(1−b))(ηL−FL(t))D)
∙
(1− ρ (1− b))αD
¡
FL (t)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
−
¡
eαD − 1
¢ ¸
(67)
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of the expression in square brackets.
Denote this expression s (t, ρ). Hence,
s (t, ρ) = (1− ρ (1− b))αD
¡
FL (t)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
−
¡
eαD − 1
¢
(68)
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to t, we get:
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∂s (t, ρ)
∂t
= (1− ρ (1− b))αDfL (t)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
> 0 (69)
Hence, the expression determining the sign of the marginal utility is increasing every-
where. Accordingly, there are three possibilities: either ∂EL(t,P )∂t > 0 for all t, or it is
negative for all t, or it attains an extreme point in that interval. For the third case,
consider the second derivative of the expected utility with respect to t at that extreme
point:
∂2EL (t, P )
∂t2
¯¯¯¯
t=t∗
= (fL (t))
2 α2 (1− ρ (1− b))De−α(W−(1−ρ(1−b))(ηL−FL(t))D) · (70)£
2
¡
eαD − 1
¢
− (1− ρ (1− b))αD
¡
FL (t)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢¤
(71)
This expression is positive at the extreme point; hence, the interior point will be a
local minimum. The only candidate that remains, then, is the pooling equilibrium with
t = 0. Inserting the premium rate
P = (1− ρ (1− b)) ηLD (72)
in the expected utility function of the low risk type, we get
EL (0, (1− ρ (1− b)) ηLD) = −αe−α(W−(1−ρ(1−b))ηLD) (73)
which is to be compared with
EL (n, 0) = −αe−αW
¡
ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
(74)
And the relevant cutoﬀ point for the parameter rho is:
ρ <
ln
¡
ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
− ηLαD
ηLαD (b− 1)
(75)
Since the high risk type will purchase the pooling contract with t = 0, this is the only
condition for non-existence of the degenerate equilibrium.
Secondly, consider the separating equilibrium. In this case we have
EL
¡etL, ¡ηL − FL ¡etL¢¢D¢ ≥ EL (tL, (ηL − FL (tL))D) (76)
for all tL ∈
£etL, n¤. It follows that the contract ¡etL, ¡ηL − FL ¡etL¢¢D¢ is better than any
pooling contract in that region as well. Hence, again we can confine our interest to the
interval t ∈
£
0,etL¢. By the same reasoning as above, the only contract that can challenge
the separating contract is one with t = 0. Hence, we have to compare
EL (t, P ) = −
¡
FL
¡etL¢ ¡eαD − 1¢+ 1¢αe−α(W−(ηL−FL(etL))D) (77)
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with EL (0, (1− ρ (1− b)) ηLD). We get the condition
ρ2 <
ln
¡
FL
¡etL¢ ¡eαD − 1¢+ 1¢− FL ¡etL¢αD
ηLDα (b− 1)
(78)
C Derivation of Wilson Equilibria
In this appendix, we characterize the conditions for diﬀerent equilibria in the Wilson
case, when individuals have an exponential utility function. Our analysis will make use
of the properties of the utility function of the low risk type, which is the maximand in
the derivation of the Wilson equilibrium.
First, if we consider the case where the self-selection constraint is binding, and impose
the zero profit constraint, we can solve for the premium rate of the low risk type. In this
case, the premium rate is equal to
PL = ρ
µ
ηHD +
1− ρ
ρ
(ηL − FL (tL))D −
1
α
ln
¡
bFL (tL)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢¶
. (79)
It is important to notice that as tL → 0, this expression approaches the pooling
premium. Accordingly, the expected utility function of the low risk type behaves smoothly
in a neighborhood of tL = 0. Next, we insert (79) into the expected utility function. After
some rearrangement, what we get is:
V (tL, ρ) = e−αW
¡
bFL (tL)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢−ρ ¡
FL (tL)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢·eαD(ρηH+(1−ρ)(ηL−FL(tL)))
(80)
which is the expected utility the low risk enjoys from admissible contracts in the range
tL ∈
£
0, t˜L
¤
.
We have established in appendix A that for separating contracts without cross-subsidization
(which in the Wilson case require tL ∈
£
t˜L, n
¤
) the equilibrium cannot be an interior point.
Hence, we have the following alternatives to consider:
1. The pooling contract
2. An interior point in the interval tL ∈
£
0, t˜L
¤
3. A separating contract without cross-subsidization at tL = t˜L
4. The degenerate equilibrium where the low risk type purchases no insurance at all.
It transpires that the relevant equilibria depend in a quite intricate manner on the
value of the parameters ρ and b. Hence, for future reference, we will now define some
useful cutoﬀ values for ρ. Firstly, we take the derivative of equation (80) with respect to
tL. This equals:
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∂V (tL, ρ)
∂tL
= e−αW
¡
bFL (tL)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢−ρ
eαD(ρηH+(1−ρ)(ηL−FL(tL)))F 0L (tL)
⎧
⎨
⎩
¡
FL (tL)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢µ
ρ
b(eαD−1)
bFL(tL)(eαD−1)+1 + (1− ρ)αD
¶
−
¡
eαD − 1
¢
⎫
⎬
⎭ (81)
The sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of the expression in the large
curly brackets. Therefore, we define this expression as s (tL, ρ). Hence,
s (tL, ρ) =
¡
FL (tL)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢Ã
ρ
b
¡
eαD − 1
¢
bFL (tL) (eαD − 1) + 1
+ (1− ρ)αD −
¡
eαD − 1
¢!
.
(82)
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to tL gives:
∂s (tL, ρ)
∂tL
= F 0L (tL)
¡
eαD − 1
¢Ã
(1− ρ)αD − ρ
b
¡
eαD − 1
¢
(bFL (tL) (eαD − 1) + 1)2
!
. (83)
The factor in the large brackets increases monotonously in tL. Besides, the expression
is decreasing in ρ. Now we can define the following cutoﬀ values:
ρ∗ =
αD
(b− 1) b (eαD − 1) + αD (84)
which is the solution to ∂s(tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=0)
= 0. Hence, for ρ > ρ∗, we have ∂s(tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=0)
< 0.
Next, we define
ρ∗∗ =
αD
¡
bFL
¡
t˜L
¢ ¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢2
(b− 1) b (eαD − 1) + αD
¡
bFL
¡
t˜L
¢
(eαD − 1) + 1
¢2 (85)
which is the solution to ∂s(tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=t˜L)
= 0. Again, the implication is that for ρ > ρ∗∗,
we have ∂s(tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=t˜L)
< 0. Furthermore, we define
ρPOOL =
¡
eαD − 1
¢
− αD
b (eαD − 1)− αD (86)
as the solution to ∂V (tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=0)
= 0. Evaluating (81) at tL = 0, we find that the expression
in the brackets is increasing in ρ. Hence, if ρ > ρPOOL, we have
∂V (tL,ρ)
∂tL (tL=0)
> 0, and the
pooling contract is not even locally optimal. Next, we define
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ρRS =
¡
bFL
¡
t˜L
¢ ¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢ ¡¡
eαD − 1
¢
− αD
¡
FL
¡
t˜L
¢ ¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢¢¡
FL
¡
t˜L
¢
(eαD − 1) + 1
¢ ¡
b (eαD − 1)− αD
¡
bFL
¡
t˜L
¢
(eαD − 1) + 1
¢¢ (87)
which is the solution to ∂V (tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=t˜L)
= 0. Finally, define
ρ2 =
ln
¡
FL
¡
t˜L
¢ ¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
− FL
¡
t˜L
¢
αD
(b− 1) ηLαD
(88)
which is the point at which the low risk type is indiﬀerent between the separating
contract without cross-subsidization
¡
t˜L,
¡
ηL − FL
¡
t˜L
¢¢
D
¢
and the pooling contract. For
higher values of ρ2, the separating contract is preferred.
Having defined these cutoﬀ values in ρ, we characterize the equilibria that prevail
under diﬀerent circumstances in the following two lemmas:
Lemma 9 if bηL < 1 and b < b∗
the following conclusions hold concerning ρ:
1. If ρ < ρ2, the only contract that is oﬀered in equilibrium is the pooling contract
(0, ρbηLD + (1− ρ) ηLD), provided that
ρ <
ln
¡
ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
− ηLαD
(b− 1) ηLαD
(89)
If the above condition is not satisfied, only the actuarial contract of the high risk type
(0, bηLD) is oﬀered in equilibrium.
2. If ρ > ρ2, the equilibrium menu includes (0, bηLD). Besides, the separating contract¡
t˜L,
¡
ηL − FL
¡
t˜L
¢¢
D
¢
will be oﬀered, provided that
eαD(ηL−FL(
etL)) < ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
FL
¡etL¢ (eαD − 1) + 1 (90)
Proof. From the condition that b < b∗ follows that
ρPOOL < ρ
∗ (91)
which implies that for all ρ < ρ∗, if the marginal utility in equation (81) changes sign
in the interval tL ∈
£
0, t˜L
¤
, it changes from negative to positive (s (tL, ρ) is monotonously
increasing in the interval). In other words, this condition precludes an interior equilibrium
in the interval tL ∈
¡
0, t˜L
¢
. Furthermore, as we established in Appendix A above, there
can be no interior equilibrium when there is no cross-subsidization either (i.e. in the
interval tL ∈
¡
t˜L, n
¢
).
Hence, for ρ < ρ∗, there are two cases to consider:
28
1. For ρ < ρ2, the pooling contract (with no cross-subsidization) is preferred over the
separating contract. Hence it will be oﬀered provided that the low risk type will actually
purchase it, which will be the case if:
EL (0, ρbηLD + (1− ρ) ηLD) > EL (92)
implying condition (89).
2. For ρ > ρ2, the separating contract (with no cross-subsidization) is preferred,
provided that it will actually be bought by the low risks, which requires
EL
¡
t˜L,
¡
ηL − FL
¡
t˜L
¢¢
D
¢
> EL (93)
implying condition (90).
For the case where ρ > ρ∗, finally, the derivative of the low risk type’s utility with
respect to tL is strictly positive for all tL ∈
£
0, t˜L
¤
, implying that the separating contract
will be oﬀered provided that condition (90) holds.
Lemma 10 if bηL < 1, b > b∗ and
FL
¡
t˜L
¢
<
b
¡
eαD − 1
¢
− αD
2bαD (eαD − 1) (94)
the following conclusions hold concerning ρ:
1. If ρ < ρPOOL, only the pooling contract will be oﬀered in equilibrium, provided that
ρ <
ln
¡
ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
− ηLαD
(b− 1) ηLαD
(95)
2. If ρ > ρRS, it is optimal to oﬀer the separating (not cross-subsidizing) menu
(0, bηLD) and
¡
t˜L,
¡
ηL − FL
¡
t˜L
¢¢
D
¢
, provided that
eαD(ηL−FL(
etL)) < ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
FL
¡etL¢ (eαD − 1) + 1 (96)
3. If ρPOOL < ρ < ρRS, it is optimal to oﬀer (t
∗
L, P
∗
L) together with (0, P
∗
H), provided
that
eαP
∗
L
¡
FL (t
∗
L)
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1
¢
< ηL
¡
eαD − 1
¢
+ 1 (97)
If the conditions of none of these three cases are satisfied, it is optimal to oﬀer only
(0, bηLD).
Proof. The common conditions for b and FL
¡
t˜L
¢
above imply that
ρ∗∗ < ρRS (98)
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ρRS > ρPOOL (99)
and
ρPOOL > ρ
∗ (100)
There are two diﬀerent cases to consider, depending on whether ρPOOL ≶ ρ∗∗:
1. ρPOOL < ρ
∗∗.
a) ρ 6 ρPOOL. In this case, it follows from ρ < ρPOOL that the pooling contract is
locally optimal, since ∂V (tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=0)
< 0. Furthermore, since ρ < ρRS, the marginal utility
is negative at tL = t˜L as well. Consequently, the pooling contract will be oﬀered, provided
that the low risk prefers it over no insurance, which is assured by condition (95).
b) ρPOOL < ρ 6 ρRS. The condition ρ > ρPOOL implies that the pooling contract
is not locally optimal (i.e. ∂V (tL,ρ)∂tL (tL=0)
> 0), hence it can be ruled out as a candidate.
Furthermore, since ρ < ρRS, marginal utility is negative at tL = t˜L. Hence, the equilibrium
is either a separating menu with cross-subsidization or a degenerate equilibrium. The
separating menu is preferred by the low risk provided that condition (97) is fulfilled.
c) ρ > ρRS. This condition implies that
∂V (tL,ρ)
∂tL
is positive throughout tL ∈
£
0, t˜L
¤
.
Hence, the equilibrium menu is the separating one without cross-subsidization, provided
that it is purchased by the low risk (which is assured by condition (96) above.
2. ρPOOL > ρ∗∗.
a) ρ 6 ρ∗∗. Since ρ < ρPOOL the pooling contract is locally optimal and since ρ < ρRS,
∂V (tL,ρ)
∂tL
is decreasing in tL at tL = t˜L. The condition ρ 6 ρ∗∗ assures that no interior
extreme point will be a maximum. Hence, the pooling contract is oﬀered in equilibrium,
provided it is purchased by the low risk type (which follows from condition (95)).
b) ρ∗∗ < ρ < ρPOOL. Again, ρ < ρPOOL assures that the pooling contract is locally
optimal, and ρ > ρ∗∗ assures that the marginal utility with respect to tL is decreasing
throughout. The equilibrium involves oﬀering the pooling contract.
c) ρPOOL < ρ < ρRS. ρ > ρPOOL precludes the pooling contract, and ρ < ρRS assures
that the marginal utility is decreasing at tL = t˜L. Hence, the low risk utility is concave
in tL over tL ∈
£
0, t˜L
¤
, and the only equilibrium candidates are a separating menu with
cross-subsidization, and a degenerate equilibrium.
d) ρ > ρRS. The marginal utility of the low risk type is positive in tL for all tL ∈
£
0, t˜L
¤
.
Hence, the equilibrium menu is the separating one without cross-subsidization, provided
that it is purchased by the low risk (which is assured by condition (96) above.
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